The Long-Term Effects of African Resistance to European Domination: Institutional Mechanism by Kodila-Tedika, Oasis & Asongu, Simplice
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Long-Term Effects of African
Resistance to European Domination:
Institutional Mechanism
Oasis Kodila-Tedika and Simplice Asongu
University of Kinshasa, Department of Economics, African
Governance and Development Institute
16 March 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/85237/
MPRA Paper No. 85237, posted 17 March 2018 21:56 UTC
1 
 
The Long-Term Effects of African 
Resistance to European Domination: 
Institutional Mechanism 
 
Oasis Kodila-Tedika 
University of Kinshasa, Department of Economics, 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
E-mail: oasiskodila@yahoo.fr 
 
Simplice A. Asongu 
African Governance and Development Institute,  
P. O. Box 8413, Yaoundé, Cameroon 
E-mail: asongusimplice@yahoo.com 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this study, we show that historic events have a long term incidence on 
institutional development. Within the framework of the paper, we attempt to 
provide insights into a historical dimension that has not received the scholarly 
attention it deserves in empirical literature, notably: African resistance in the 
face of colonization. The main finding suggests that contemporary institutions 
in Africa are endogenous to historical trajectories adopted by countries in the 
continent. Countries that experienced high resistance to colonial domination 
are associated with better contemporary governance standards. The findings are 
robust to a multitude of tests, notably: changes in estimation techniques, 
accounting for outliers, transformation of the outcome variable, control for 
endogeneity and changes of the outcome variable.  
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1. Motivation 
Over the past decades, the consequences of the non-contemporary resistance to 
African domination have not been comprehensively studied by both historians 
and economists (Boahen, 1987). This tendency is most apparent in empirical 
literature. Recently Kodila-Tedika  et al. (2016) have shown that this resistance 
to colonization has had a contemporary negative effect on the development of 
Africa. In the same vein, Wantchekon and Garcia-Ponce (2015) earlier 
established that the level of democracy prevalent in Africa is endogenous to the 
types of resistance movements that occurred across Africa during 
independence. According to the narrative, urban manifestation or resistance 
enabled participants to elaborate peaceful norms of expression. Conversely, 
armed rebellions produced a culture of political exclusion which established 
violence as a mechanism of political expression and channel to the resolution 
of conflicts. Wantchekon and Garcia-Ponce (2011) also investigated the 
incidence of repressing the 1947 revolt in Madagascar to establish long term 
negative effects of the repression on contemporary levels of freedom of 
expression.  
The present paper is positioned as an extension of the underlying studies in the 
scant literature. We attempt to demonstrate that contemporary African 
institutions are a function of historic events, notably: the resistance to European 
colonial domination. Accordingly, resistance to European colonial domination 
has had a negative incidence on contemporary institutions in Africa. Hence, the 
hypothesis underlying this study builds on prior established evidence from 
Wantchékon and García-Ponce (2015) in the perspective that movements of 
colonial resistance were more apparent in rural areas than in urban areas. This 
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is essentially because rural areas are more conducive to hiding owing to inter 
alia: topography (e.g. ruggedness) and forests.  
Hence, as was apparent in the post-colonial period, most guerilla movements of 
resistance developed in rural areas. Therefore, a correlation between rural areas 
and resistance to colonial domination is logical. Moreover, high concentration 
of resistance movements resulted in a violent transition from colonial rule to 
independence. The position is more apparent in the light of the postulation of 
Oloruntimehin (1987, 613).  “It is a mistake to consider, as has been done so 
far, African nationalism as an elitist and purely urban phenomenon. Recent 
work is increasingly revealing the importance in rural areas of discontent and 
anticolonialist sentiments”1. This postulation is substantiated by Boahen (1987) 
in the perspective that resistance movements in Western Africa were harbored 
for the most part in rural areas.  
Numerous studies have focused on the dimension of institutional cost    (Meisel 
& Aoudia, 2008, 2009), given that institutions need to be funded from a fiscal 
perspective (Meisel & Aoudia, 2009; Besley & Persson, 2009, 2013; Besley et 
al., 2013). However, resistance to colonial domination hampers the effective 
development of state capacities that are essential for fiscal resource 
mobilization in view of funding, developing and sustaining institutions in a 
country. 
Another argument is that the contemporary quality of institutions is dependent 
on Western hegemony, owing to inter alia; foreign aid affects the quality of 
governance (Asongu, 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). This narrative is 
consistent with the positioning that Western-imposed structural adjustment 
                                                          
1
 Translated emphasis from original.   
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programs and neocolonialism have substantially contributed to affect 
institutions in Africa because these foreign policies constrain African leaders to 
be accountable to the foreign leaders and institutions, and not to African 
citizens.  
Related literature. This study complements the extant literature on the 
contemporary politico-economic development effects of historical events (e.g. 
Nunn, 2009; 2014). Englebert (2000) has argued that changes in the degree by 
which institutions in the post-colonial era clash with pre-existing institutions 
substantially account for variations in state capacity and economic prosperity in 
Africa. According to Acemoglu et al. (2001), the rate of mortality of 
colonialists is linked to the contemporary level of institutional and economic 
developments in Africa. According to Nunn (2008), slave trade explains 
contemporary African development. The relationship is explained by Nunn and 
Wantchekon (2011) within the framework of deteriorations of trust in trade 
relations. A nexus is established by Nunn (2010) between the location of 
Christian missions and modern development outcomes. Cagé and Rueda (2016) 
establish the long-term role of missionaries in social capital. According to 
Bezemer et al. (2014), indigenous slavery is negatively linked to current 
income levels.  
Bertocchi and Canova (2002) have shown that colonization is a main cause of 
Africa’s underdevelopment while Huillery (2009, 2011) has presented 
evidence on the impacts of post-colonial institutions of public education on 
health. According to Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011), the partitioning 
of ethnic groups by colonizers has generated more conflicts, compared to 
regions that were not impacted by border partition. The transatlantic slave trade 
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has had an incidence on ethnic stratification in Africa (Whatley & Gillezeau, 
2011).  
Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007) have provided cross-country evidence 
substantiating that pre-colonial political centralization positively correlates 
with contemporary institutions and the provision of public commodities. A link 
between regional economic development and pre-colonial political 
centralization is established by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013). Besley 
and Reynal-Querol (2014) have established that historical conflict is linked to 
greater prevalence of post-colonial conflict with, a higher sense of ethnic 
identity, lower levels of trust, and a weaker sense of cross-country national 
identity and with prevalent networks of development looking at the within-
country grid-cells patterns. The relevance of historical political centralization 
on the prospect of contemporary conflicts of civil nature has been empirically 
examined by Depetris-Chauvin (2014).   
A positive relationship is established by Bates (2014) on the connection 
between competition within the military and the centralization of the state in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The findings provide more insights into when and where 
“war makes sates”. Furthermore, Bandyopadhyay and Green (2016) have 
employed a Ugandan case study to document a positive nexus between 
historical institutions (with emphasis on pre-colonial era political 
centralization) and contemporary development outcomes.  Using a new dataset 
on local government income and expenditure for native authorities across some 
former British colonies (i.e. Malawi, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria), Bolt and 
Garder (2016) have established an accurate link between colonial institutions, 
indigenous state and contemporary development.  They find a significant nexus 
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between local authority revenue per capita and pre-colonial centralization. The 
relationship is robust to the control for geographic and economic factors.  
In the light of the above, the main contribution of this study to the extant 
literature is to articulate the relevance of a historical event to contemporary 
institutional change. The rest of the study is structured as follows. A historical 
background is presented in Section 2. The data and methodology are covered in 
Section 3 while Section 4 presents the findings and corresponding discussion. 
Robustness checks are presented in Section 5 while concerns about 
endogeneity are engaged in Section 6.  Channels to persistence are covered in 
Section 7 while we conclude with Section 8. 
2 Historical background 
Consistent with Kodila-Tedika et al. (2016), between 1880 and 1935, the 
continent of Africa witnessed the start of the European colonial domination 
which resulted in the partition of almost all the continent. Adu (1987a, b) 
maintains that only approximately 20% of Africa was occupied or controlled 
by colonialists in 1880. However, with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia, 
by 1914, the whole continent of Africa was within the control of colonial 
power which had divided the continent among themselves without 
consideration for cultural realities. Hence, such division let to substantial 
cultural damages, which among other factors, led to resistance movements 
against European colonisation and domination.  
African colonial domination and corresponding reactions (i.e. resistant 
initiatives) can be divided into a multitude of phases (Adu, 1987a, b). The first 
phase which occurred between 1880 and 1919 is aptly characterised by 
confrontation within the perspectives of defence of independence and 
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sovereignty. This phase can be sub-divided into two periods, notably: 1880-
1890 and 1890-1919 which respectively correspond to sub-periods of conquest 
and occupation. The second phase which is captured by the period 1919 to 
1935 is encapsulated by some form of adaptations on the part of Africans that 
are reflected in terms of protesting and resistance strategies.   The third phase 
which approximately begins from 1935 encompasses the phase that is 
characterised by post-colonial movements of resistance, notably, with: 
increasingly active resistance and concrete strategies.  
 Among the various phases outlined above, it is relevant to articulate that 
contact between the external world and Africa had already been established 
even before the first phase (Crowder, 1968, p. 17-19).  Accordingly, a quasi-
form of colonization such as slave trade was already prevalent and the sale of 
human beings was  responsible for the occurrence of many issues then, 
notably: within Africa and between Europeans and Africans.  In essence, 
between the mid-15
th
 century (upon the first contacts) through 1880, 
interactions might have been characterized as principally commercial, contrary 
to political interactions, such that Africans retained some degree political input 
even in regions that were fundamentally dominated by  European powers.  
The underlying modicum of African political influence was lost dramatically at 
the beginning of the first phase when Africa was partitioned among European 
powers between November 15
th
 1884 and November 26
th
 1885, with the 
notable Berlin Conference. From the Berlin Conference, the partition was 
characterised by various protocols, notably: in some cases, Europeans and 
Africans concluded treaties (e.g. treaties signed between the Buganda and 
Imperial British East Africa Company) and in others, bilateral treaties were 
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established between Europeans (e.g. the Anglo-German treaty on the 
delimitation in 1886). With regard to the narrative, such partitioning of the 
African continent was partly motivated by White supremacy (building, inter 
alia on social Atavism and Darwinism) and partly inspired by the inexorable 
constraints of capitalism.   
The conquest in the field was spectacular and bloody such that by 1902 the 
conquest was almost complete on the continent. The bloody historical 
experience was characterised by a bitter experience for Africans due to inter 
alia: the comparatively sophistication of European technology and devastating 
firepower of the machine gun (Kodila-Tedika et al., 2016). While Europe’s 
conquest of Africa was relatively easy, the occupation of the continent and 
subsequent consolidation of established European administration was quite 
difficult (Uzoigwe 1987, 65) because Africans for the most part did not bow to 
the domination (Ranger, 1987).  Accordingly, there was resistance to European 
domination from all quarters in Africa. However, striking disparities in the 
intensity of resistance varied from one region to another. For instance, in 
Northern Rhodesia (which is today’s Zambia), armed resistance movements 
were apparent. These resistance movements were feeble in terms of magnitude 
when compared with those that occurred in Southern Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe). With respect to effectiveness in organisation, the cases of 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia pale in comparison to movements of 
resistances in the Zambezi valley against the Portuguese (Ranger, 1987).   
As we have already emphasised above, all regions in Africa ware characterised 
by resistance movements. For  instance, in North-East Africa, the Mahdist 
revolution of Sudan constituted one of the major rebellions while in French 
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West Africa, the conquest by Europeans and subsequent occupation attained 
their apogee between 1880 and 1990 (Gueye & Boahen, 1987, 137), 
substantially consolidated by military strategies. The Chief of the Mandenopta 
Empire in the capacity of Samori Toure openly preferred confrontation instead 
of a strategy of alliance. In essence, while he employed diplomacy, armed 
resistance was the dominant strategy.   
In Central Africa (Isaacman & Vansina, 1987)
2
 and East Africa (Mwanzi, 
1987), Europeans were met with strategies of both resistance and diplomacy, 
contrary scenarios in British West Africa where the British occasionally 
preferred peaceful negotiations, though some violent cases ware also apparent.  
It is admitted by Rodney (1987) that between 1880 and 1910, economic 
colonization was substantially slowed down by African resistance movements. 
However, accordingly to Adu (1987a, b) the dominance of Europe continued in 
the second phase.   
The nationalist sentiment grew between 1919 and 1935 and the configuration 
of colonial administration only boosted the process. Hence, exclusive 
development that educated Africans were confronted with (in the light of their 
European peers with the same levels of education), motivated much of the need 
for the emancipation and independence of Africa. According to Oloruntimehin 
(1987), for efficiency and economic motives, elites in Africa were no longer 
contented with structures of intermediate nature. For instance, in West Africa, 
the riots in Sierra Leone in 1919 were due to among others: unemployment in 
major cities and frustration from educated Africans.  
  
                                                          
2
 Davidson et al. (1987, p. 739) have aptly documented the situation in Central Africa. 
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3. Data and methodology  
The data on African resistance to colonial domination is from Frankema 
(2012). According to the author, the index is computed on a scale of 1 to 5 with 
high values denoting a higher level of insecurity or resistance. From another 
perspective, insecurity is the product of the failure by colonial powers to invest 
in the suppression of movements of resistance. The most important phase in the 
determination of this index is the interval between the Berlin conferences (of 
1884-1885) and the beginning of World War I.
3
 An illustration of native 
resistance in the light of magnitude of resistance is provided in Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1. Native resistance 
 
 
The native resistance indicator has been substantially used in the literature. For 
instance, Frankema (2012) has used it to establish the effect of native 
resistance on education in Africa whereas Kodila-Tedika et al. (2016) have 
                                                          
3As previously noted, the conference of Berlin marks the beginning of the conquest of the African 
continent on a massive scale. 
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employed it to substantiate that economic development in Africa has been 
hampered by resistance to Western domination.   
The outcome variable is obtained from Principal Component Analysis (PCA). 
Consistent with recent African governance literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016b; Asongu et al., 2018), the institutional variable is the first principal 
component of six World Bank governance indicators from Kaufman et al. 
(2007), notably: political stability/no violence, voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, regulation quality, corruption-control and the rule of 
law.  Compared to simple average, PCA produces better weights because it 
entails the computation of the eigenvalue decomposition of a data covariance 
matrix after centring the data on average for each attribute of components 
constituting the outcome variable (Tchamyou, 2017, 2018). Accordingly, 
multidimensional data is transformed by the analysis to a composite indicator 
(weighted institutions), such that the highest variance moves to a point on the 
first coordinate. The first principal component is retained as the composite 
indicator because it has an eigen value which is greater than one or the mean. 
This choice of the first principal component is consistent with recent African 
institutional literature (Asongu, 2015; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c, 2017).  
An alternative governance indicator from the Mo Ibrahim foundation is used 
for robustness checks. This governance indicator has been used in recent 
institutional literature (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016). The indicator from the 
Mo Ibrahim Foundation consists of a multitude of variables measuring the 
same dimension from varying sources or measuring similar dimensions from 
the same source. The underlying variables are: property rights from the 
Berstelmann Foundation; property rights from the African Development Bank 
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and the World Bank; guaranteed of rights from the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU); the World Street Journals and property rights from the Heritage 
Foundation.  
The choice of the control variables is consistent with recent institutional quality 
literature (Ayyagari et al., 2006; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016). These 
indicators include: Real GDP per capita; legal origins; resource-wealth; ethnic 
fractionalisation; latitude; social infrastructure; state history and location in 
tropics. Real GDP per capita data is sourced from Maddison (2003) while 
Legal origins are obtained from La Porta et al. (1999). All countries in the 
sample are coded as either British common law or French civil law countries.  
Resource wealth in terms of the production of crude petroleum is from the 
British Geological Survey’s World Mineral Statistics and World Mineral 
Production. All the three indicators are computed as the natural logarithm of 
the mean annual per capita production during the period 1970-2000. The ethic 
fractionalisation variable (Ethnicfract) is from Alesina et al. (2003) while data 
on the history of the state is from Putterman (2007). The tropical and latitude 
indicators are from Easterly (2011) and La Porta et al. (1999) respectively.   
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Obs Mean     Std. Dev.        Max Min  
Native resistance 42     3.357     1.2845           5 1 
GDP per capita (log) 52     7.134     .825    9.274 5.385    
UK legal origin 52     .346     .480           1 0 
ln(oil prod/pop) 52    -6.715     4.031    3.236 -9.210    
Governance  52 47.773 13.605 75.565 9.675 
Institution  50 -1.603 1.416 1.813 -4.893 
Latitude  42 11.414 7.458 29 .2 
Social infrastructure  48 .292 .135 .851 .112 
Ethnic fractionalization 51 .630 .251 .930 0 
State history  46 .3339 .2307 .028 .964 
Tropical  42 58.449 40.917 0 100 
There are 50 observations for our principal variable to be estimated. Missing observations are 
apparent for Namibia, Guinea-Bissau and Algeria. There are also missing observations for 
Sudan. Most missing observations are apparent in the infrastructure indicator, notably in the 
following countries: Libya; Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome & Principe.   
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Institution (1) 1.000         
Native resistance (2) -0.622    1.000        
GDP per capita 
(log) (3) 
0.603   -0.529    1.000       
ln(oil prod/pop) (4) -0.252    0.031    0.191   1.000      
Ethnic 
fractionalization (5) 
-0.203    0.213   -0.172 0.39         
State history (6) -0.081    0.303  -0.019 0.057   -0.051        
UK legal origin (7) -0.042   -0.262    0.0882   -0.200 -0.064   -0.095 1.000   
Latitude (8) 0.518 -0.415 0.2735   -0.486   -0.516   -0.014 0.237    1.000  
Tropical (9) -0.122    0.022 0.0016    0.373 0.375 -0.298 -0.299   -0.551 1.000 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics and from the summary statistics, it is 
apparent that the variables are comparable. Moreover, from the corresponding 
standard deviations, we can be confident that reasonable estimated linkages 
would emerge owing to the substantial degree of variations.  The correlation 
matrix disclosed in Table 2 provides the study with insights into the absence of 
substantial issues of multicollinearity on the one hand and on the other, a 
feeling of expected signs between the independent variable of interest (or 
native resistance) and outcome variables (institutions). While the negative 
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correlation informs the study that the motivation in the introduction could 
withstand empirical scrutiny, it is relevant to substantiate the correlation with 
empirical validity because native resistance and institutions do not interacte in 
isolation, but are contingent on other factors which should be captured by the 
conditioning information set in the perspective of control variables.   
Consistent with recent development literature which is based on cross-sectional 
data (Asongu, 2013 Kodila-Tedika & Asongu, 2015a, 2015b, 2018a), the 
specification in Eq. (1) examines the correlation between native resistance and 
institutions.  
iiii CNRInt   321  ,                                                                   (1) 
where, iInt ( iNR ) represents institutions (native resistance) indicator for 
country i , 1  is a constant, C  is the vector of control variables, and i  the 
error term. C includes a set of controls to account for the potential direct effects 
on institution from state history and geographical variables.  Hence, the 
purpose of Eq. (1) is to estimate if native resistance affects institutions. The 
estimation process is by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors 
that are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
4. Empirical results  
The empirical results are presented in this section. The section seeks to 
substantiate the naïve correlations established in Table 2 with empirical 
validity. Table 3 presents the main results from the OLS findings (in the light 
of Equation 1) in columns 2 to 6.  
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Table 3. Main results 
 
eq1 eq2 eq3 eq4 eq5 
Native resistance -0.642*** -0.481*** -0.378** -0.570*** -0.498*** 
 
(0.149) (0.144) (0.155) (0.157) (0.135) 
GDP per capita (log) 
 
0.506 0.827*** 0.989*** 0.921*** 
  
(0.349) (0.255) (0.285) (0.283) 
ln(oil prod/pop) 
  
-0.154*** -0.180*** -0.145*** 
   
(0.042) (0.039) (0.042) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
   
0.902 1.282 
    
(0.753) (0.842) 
State history  
   
0.566 0.418 
    
(0.709) (0.774) 
UK legal origin 
   
-0.857** -0.905** 
    
(0.388) (0.389) 
Latitude 
    
0.044 
     
(0.030) 
Tropical  
    
-0.000 
     
(0.005) 
Constant 0.345 -3.708 -7.383*** -8.427*** -8.639*** 
 
(0.534) (2.608) (2.159) (2.570) (2.403) 
Number of observations 40 40 40 35 35 
R
2
 0.337 0.391 0.535 0.681 0.705 
Notes. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in brackets. 0.01 - ***; 0.05 
- **; 0.1 - *. 
The findings in Column 2 depict a simple linear relationship between the 
outcome variable and the independent variable of interest. A significant 
relationship is apparent between institutions and native resistance. Based on the 
coefficient of adjustment, native resistance explains about 33.7% of institutions 
in Africa. The negative relationship between native resistance and institutions 
is robust to the introduction of other macroeconomic, geographic and historic 
variables in the conditioning information set. Most of the significant control 
variables display the expected signs, notably: income levels have been 
established to be associated with higher levels of institutions in Africa 
(Asongu, 2012) and nations that have acknowledged scarcity in natural 
resources have also been associated with higher levels of institutions (America, 
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2013; Amavilah, 2015), partly because of the recourse curse which is most 
apparent in oil-rich countries.  
With regard to the control variable with the insignificant sign, we expected the 
UK legal origin to positively affect institutions. This is under the assumption 
that the French legal origin will display the opposite sign. Within this 
framework, the underpinning assumption on the comparative strength of the 
UK legal origin vis-à-vis France legal origin may not hold for a multitude of 
reasons (see Deakin & Siems 2010; Fowowe, 2014; Asongu, 2018). (i) Doubts 
have been expressed in some scholarly circles on whether the distinction 
between UK legal origin and France legal origin is justifiable from a historical 
perspective. (ii) With globalization, the distinction between Civil law (i.e. a 
French legal tradition) and Common law (a UK legal tradition) is less 
persuasive. (iii) The classification of nations with respect to Common law 
versus Civil law fails to take into consideration the following factors, among 
others: modifications and mixtures at the moment former colonies copied 
foreign laws, the influence of transplant law and the post-transplant period 
during which the transplanted law could still be altered and/or applied 
differently. 
We also notice that the coefficient of adjustment or determination increases 
from the left-hand-side to the right-hand-side. The increase of this explanatory 
power of the model is contingent on the increase of variables in the 
conditioning information set. In essence, the involvement of more variables in 
the conditioning information set translates the fact that the model is more 
realistic by taking more factors into account. This is essentially because in a 
real world, contrary to the model in the second column, the interaction between 
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native resistance and institutions does not take place in isolation but involves 
other historic and geographic factors captured by the conditioning information 
set.  
5. Robustness checks 
This section is substantiated with three main robustness checks, notably: (i) the 
use of alternative institutional indicators; (ii) the transformation of resistance 
indicators and (iii) the account for influential observations. The multitude of 
robustness checks are substantiated in chronological order. In each of the 
estimations, the control variables employed in the last column of Table 3 are 
used but not disclosed for lack of space.  
5.1. Use of alternative institutional indicators 
In order to test the solidity of our findings, we use alternative indicators of 
institutional development. First, we employ the measure of Hall and Jones 
(1999): an indicator of institutional quality, termed “social infrastructure”. 
Moreover, following Kodila-Tedika (2014) and Kodila-Tedika and Asongu 
(2016), we exploit the Mo Ibrahim Foundation Governance Index. This 
indicator compiles 86 indicators of governance regrouped into 14 sub-
categories and four categories, notably:  security and rule of law, participation 
and human rights, sustainable economic development and human development. 
The Mo Ibrahim Index represents the most comprehensive annual collection of 
quantitative data which is suitable for cross-country empirical studies of 
governance in Africa.  
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Table 4. Alternative indicators of institution 
 
Social 
Infrastructure 
Governance  
(Mo Ibrahim) 
Native resistance -0.027 -4.075** 
 
(0.019) (1.595) 
Constant -0.563* -20.700 
 
(0.299) (21.482) 
Number of observations 34 34 
R
2
 0.740 0.606 
Notes. OLS estimates of (1) are reported. Coefficients are reported 
with standard errors in brackets. All estimations contain constant 
and reproduce control variables in the last column of Table 3. 0.01 
- ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - *. 
 
The estimations in Table 4 confirm previously established findings, notably: on 
the negative relationship between native resistance and institutional 
development. Whereas the nexus is not significant in the second column 
(pertaining to social infrastructure), it is significant in the third column (in 
relation to the Mo Ibrahim indicator of governance).  It is also important to 
note that in terms of magnitude of significance, the effect on the indicator of 
the Mo Ibrahim foundation is substantially higher compared to the 
corresponding incidence on the social infrastructure indicator from Hall and 
Jones (1999).  
We have also used other types of resistance measurements. The conclusions do 
not diverge. This reinforces these results
4
. 
5.2. Transformation of resistance indicators  
In Table 5, we replicate the estimations of the last column of Table 3 with 
emphasis on extreme observations. Box-transformation, or transformation of 
the resistance variable is employed in Column 2 and we use the logarithm of 
resistance in Column 3. We notice that the variable of interest remains 
                                                          
4
 These results are available on request. 
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consistently significant with the same negative sign, though with an improved 
coefficient. Hence, we conclude that native resistance is negatively linked to 
contemporary African institutional development. As shown in the Appendix, 
the established findings still withstand empirical scrutiny when the underlying 
transformation process is performed for the alternative outcome variables.  
Table 5. Transformation of the resistance indicator 
 
Box-Cox Transformation of 
Resistance  
Using 
ln(Resistance) 
Resistance  -0.403*** -1.129** 
 
(0.103) (0.525) 
Constant -9.227*** -9.357*** 
 
(2.245) (2.892) 
Number of observations 35 35 
R
2
 0.711 0.662 
Notes. OLS estimates of (1) are reported. Coefficients are reported 
with standard errors in brackets. All estimations contain constant 
and reproduce control variables in the last column of Table 3. 0.01 
- ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - *. 
 
5.3. Robustness with respect to influential observations 
Madagascar is a poor leverage point. Its characteristics are pretty different from 
those of the bulk of the data and its institution is much higher than it should be 
according to the fitted model. Mauritania, Burundi, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Botswana are substantial leverage points because they are outlying in 
the horizontal dimension but not in the vertical one. This means that their 
characteristics are rather different from those of other countries. Finally, these 
outlying observations are sufficient to distort classical estimations (Table 3). 
Because several vertical outliers are present as well as a severe poor leverage 
point, there is a serious risk that the OLS estimator becomes strongly attracted 
by the outliers.  
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Figure 1. Diagnostic plot of standardized robust residuals versus robust 
Mahalanobis distances for the estimations of  Table 1 (Column 5) 
 
In Table 6, in order to further examine if the established finding in Table 3 
withstand empirical scrutiny, we follow the empirical approach on M-
estimators from Huber (1973) using Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares 
(IRWLS) in Column  2 of Table 6. In Column 3 and Column 4 respectively, 
the ten most resistant and ten least resistant countries are omitted. As has been 
noted by Midi and Talib (2008), compared to the OLS approach, the advantage 
of these robust estimators is that they simultaneously fix any issue arising from 
the existence of outliers and/or non-constant error variances (i.e. 
heteroskedasticity). The results in Table 6 confirm those established in Table 3 
in terms of significance and sign of the independent variable of interest. 
Surprisingly, the findings in the last-two columns are the same.  
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Table 6. Robustness check for the presence of outliers 
 
IWRLS 
Omit 10 Most 
Resistance 
Omit 10 
Smallest 
Native resistance -0.486** -0.683*** -0.683*** 
 
(0.196) (0.162) (0.162) 
Constant  -8.381*** -7.859** -7.859** 
 
(2.808) (3.104) (3.104) 
Number of observations 35 28 28 
R
2
 0.648 0.635 0.635 
Notes. OLS estimates of (1) are reported. Coefficients are reported 
with standard errors in brackets. All estimations contain constant 
and reproduce control variables in the last column of Table 3. 0.01 
- ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - *. 
Table 7 below presents a further robustness check in which we exclude 
regions. Its objective is to investigate the relevance of the established 
relationship in Table 3 when regions are excluded from the sample. This 
robustness measure also denotes a means of accounting from extreme values 
that can affect the baseline results. The comparatively lower correlation 
coefficients observed when some regions are excluded imply that the excluded 
region has a substantial weight in the established relationship. In the same vein, 
a comparatively higher correlation coefficient upon the exclusion of a region 
implies the excluded region reflects a larger variation and variables that are 
more related to institutions. The results in Table 7 confirm those established in 
Table 3 in terms of significance and sign of the independent variable of 
interest.  
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Table 7. Exclusion of continents 
 
Exclusion 
North  
Exclusion 
South 
Exclusion 
Weoust 
Exclusion 
East 
Exclusion 
Central  
Native resistance -0.498*** -0.523** -0.576** -0.401* -0.585** 
 
(0.174) (0,219) (0.261) (0.208) (0.214) 
Constant -8.639*** -7.386** -7.905** -11.927*** -6.855** 
 
(2.502) (3.144) (3.177) (2.897) (3.173) 
Number of observations 35 28 22 27 28 
R
2
 0.705 0.727 0.790 0,703 0,687 
 
Notes. OLS estimates of (1) are reported. Coefficients are reported 
with standard errors in brackets. All estimations contain constant 
and reproduce control variables in the last column of Table 3. 0.01 
- ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - *. 
6. Endogeneity 
Whereas the nexus between the two variables of interest (i.e. resistance and 
institutional development) has been established, issues of endogeneity are still 
apparent. Accordingly, the non-contemporary character of the resistance 
indicators can be used to make a case for a possible causal impact between the 
two variables of interest. Moreover, it is relevant to emphasize that most 
variables in the conditioning information set have historical fundamentals (e.g. 
Kodila-Tedika & Asongu, 2018b), which could generate issues of variable 
omission bias owing to the fact that the outcome variable is contemporary. 
Another reason for employing a Two Stage Least Squares regression is to 
control for the concern of endogeneity is the quality of the indicator. The 
weakness is aptly documented by Kodila-Tedika et al. (2016) who have used 
the same measure of resistance. In the paper, the resistance variable is 
instrumented with instruments from Nunn (2008), namely: Atlantic distance, 
Indian distance, Saharan distance and Red Sea distance. 
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Table 8. Native resistance and institution : 2SLS 
 
I II III 
Native resistance -10.500*** -4.807* -0.026 
 
(5.195) (2.671) (0.024) 
Constant -18.254 -14.583 -0.565* 
 
(50.693) (30.753) (0.328) 
Number of observations 35 32 34 
R
2
 0.520 0.6257 0.790 
Anderson canon. corr. LM 
statistic (p-value) 
0.3479 0.2738 0.2315 
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.7404 0.2228 0.0932 
 
Notes. OLS estimates of (1) are reported. Coefficients are reported 
with standard errors in brackets. All estimations contain constant 
and reproduce control variables in the last column of Table 3. 0.01 
- ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - *. 
The 2SLS results are presented in Table 8. In the first column, the outcome 
variable is from Kaufmann et al. (2007). In the second column, the governance 
variable is from Mo Ibrahim while in the third column, it is from Hall and 
Jones (1999). With the exception of the third model pertaining to the 
institutions indicator from Hall and Jones (1999), the Hansen test confirms the 
validity of the instruments used. Hence, a causal negative relationship can be 
inferred from the two variables of interest. 
7. Channels of Persistence 
After robustly establishing the relationship between institutions and native 
resistance, it is important to further investigate channels through which the 
relationship withstands empirical scrutiny. Many mechanisms are considered in 
this respect, notably: human capital, the capacity of the state, pre-independence 
institutions and conflicts. The findings on these mechanisms are disclosed in 
Table 9. Our first hypothesis is that native resistance affects institutions by 
reducing the accumulation of human capital. Glaeser et al. (2004) and Kuada 
(2015) have established that human capital is the basis for good institutions: a 
stance that has been confirmed from a broad framework by Kalonda-Kanyama 
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and Kodila-Tedika (2012) and with the use of African data by Kodila-Tedika 
(2014). The hypothesis builds on the fact that Frankema (2011, 2012) has 
established a negative relationship between human capital accumulation and 
native resistance. With this channel in mind, it is reasonable to infer that the 
negative nexus between institutional quality and native resistance may be due 
to decreasing human capital accumulation.  
With regard to the second hypothesis, Acemoglu et al. (2014) have argued that 
in Africa, the capacities and structures of local governments have substantial 
ramifications for subsequent development outcomes. We confirm the negative 
nexus between the public income and the degree of resistance (see Table 2, 
Column 2)
5
. This implies that sufficient financial resources were not mobilized 
by state apparatus in order to offset the administering costs engendered by 
various colonies, essentially because native resistance augmented with progress 
of colonial administrators and implicit taxation. For instance, in 1898, chiefs 
that were linked with Mende in Sierra Leon revolted and unanimously took the 
decision not to pay any tax. The rebellion led to the promulgation of the 1896 
Protectorate Ordinance by the British government which established direct 
British governance and imposed 5 shillings and 10 shillings annual taxation for 
respectively, two-room and larger houses. 
                                                          
5The data is obtained from Frankema and van Waijenburg (2013). This is data before independence. 
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Table 9. Potential Mechanisms 
 
Fiscal revenu 
Poppar colonial 
administrator 
Centralization 
Vertical 
legitimacy 
Horizontal legitimacy Ethnic fractionalization 
Native resistance -0.199** -0.261*** 17.385*** 24.935*** -0.031 -0.023 -0.087* -0.090* -0.045 -0.043 0.058** 0.040* 
 
(0.073) (0.069) (5.161) (5.856) (0.043) (0.046) (0.047) (0.053) (0.040) (0.041) (0.024) (0.024) 
Regional fixe effects NO YES  NO YES  NO YES  NO YES  NO YES  NO YES  
Constant  0.943*** 1.133*** -21.808 -60.450** 0.633*** 0.645*** 0.481*** 0.611** 0.715*** 0.814*** 0.485*** 0.624*** 
 
(0.254) (0.297) (17.808) (26.935) (0.158) (0.158) (0.169) (0.229) (0.145) (0.138) (0.088) (0.108) 
Number of observations 25 25 32 32 40 40 42 42 42 42 41 41 
R2 0.243 0.518 0.274 0.475 0.014 0.074 0.078 0.279 0.035 0.161 0.127 0.333 
Notes. OLS estimates of (1) are reported. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in brackets. All estimations contain constant and reproduce control variables in the last column 
of Table 3. 0.01 - ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - * 
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Our hypothesis on the low mobilization of tax income has at least two 
consequences on institutional development. First, a weak mobilization of 
income did not provide African nations with sufficient financial resources with 
which to support institutions of higher quality. This explanation is even more 
logical and consistent with findings because we have established that the wealth 
of nations or GDP per capita is positively associated with institutional quality. 
Second, the low tax collection rate also legitimized a weak fiscal culture which 
seriously undermines the accumulation of financial resources that are essential 
for the provision of public commodities.  
The third hypothesis underpinning this section is what is termed “institutional 
capital”. Following Acemoglu et al. (2001), we deduct that African countries 
which initially had good institutions are those which present a comparative 
contemporary advantage over others. However, this relevance on initial 
conditions is contingent on some factors. Within this specific framework, the 
analysis builds on the fact that countries which experienced high levels of 
native resistance are those that have developed institutions that are not 
consistent with contemporary levels of development, especially with regard to 
inclusive development. In effect, resistance is social conflict which reduces 
possibilities of social harmony. We confirm this thesis by considering many 
pre-independence institutional indicators, notably: data from Richens (2009); 
data on centralization from Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007), on legitimacy 
from Englebert (2000) and ethnic fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003). 
Of all the estimations, only results corresponding to data from a few sources are 
not significant, notably: Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007) and Englebert 
(2000). However, the expected signs is consistent with those established earlier. 
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There is a negative correlation between resistance and centralization on the one 
hand and on the other, with horizontal legitimacy. It is apparent that vertical 
legitimacy is negatively associated with institutional development, positively 
linked with an increase in the number of colonial administrators (data from 
Richens, 2009). A societal disharmony, based on an administration that is 
overwhelmed with issues can therefore be inferred. Ndulu and van de Walle 
(1996) and Sindzingre (2004)  have established that in states with low income, 
nations states should support a society based on consensus as well as an 
administration capable of promoting pro-market and efficient policies.  
Our findings within the framework of Africa do not support the underlying 
position from Ndulu, van de Walle and Sindzingre.  This is apparent from the 
established positive relationship when ethnic fractionalization is considered. 
Young (1976) and Bates (1983) have shown that ethnic identifies and groups 
have evolved with modernization. Building on this postulate, we understand 
that owing to inequalities that increased in the era of colonization, ethnic 
tensions could emerge. However, beyond colonial manipulation, it is logical to 
infer that restrictive institutional development is the result of exclusions, in the 
light of Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) within the context of the New world. In 
the face of these different elements, it can be inferred that low institutional 
capital is associated with nations in which native resistance was high. 
8. Concluding remarks  
In this study, we show that historic events have a long term incidence on 
institutional development. Within the framework of the paper, we attempt to 
provide insights into a historical dimension that has not received the scholarly 
attention it deserves in empirical literature, notably: African resistance in the 
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face of colonization. The main finding suggests that contemporary institutions 
in Africa are endogenous to historical trajectories adopted by countries in the 
continent. Countries that experienced high resistance to colonial domination are 
associated with better contemporary governance standards. The findings are 
robust to a multitude of tests, notably: changes in estimation techniques, 
accounting for outliers, transformation of the outcome variable, control for 
endogeneity and changes of the outcome variable. 
The main contribution of this study has been to extant scholarly literature by 
providing empirical insights with which historical events can be used to explain 
the contemporary poor institutions in Africa. Future studies can extend the 
corresponding literature by assessing the relevance of non-contemporary native 
resistance within the context of other contemporary development outcomes. 
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